



Global Report 2011

Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility

Monty G. Marshall

Benjamin R. Cole



Center for Systemic Peace

CENTER FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE

The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) is a non-profit organization that was founded in 1997. The Center is engaged in innovative research focused on the problem of political violence within the structural context of the dynamic global system, that is, global societal-systems analysis. The Center supports scientific research, data collection, and quantitative analysis in many issue areas related to the fundamental problem of political violence in both human social relations and societal development. The focus of CSP research is on the possibilities of complex, systemic management of all manner of societal and systemic conflicts. Recognizing that the foundation of liberal democratic governance is an informed, active public, the Center regularly monitors and reports on general trends in societal-system performance, at the global, regional, and state levels of analysis and in the key systemic dimensions of conflict, governance, and (human and physical) development.

www.systemicpeace.org

SOCIETAL-SYSTEMS RESEARCH INC

Societal-Systems Research Inc is the open-source research, contracting, and consulting enterprise that provides original research and analytic support and products that underwrite the Center for Systemic Peace's Web-based public information resources covering key factors and trends that characterize the past, present, and future performance of the global system in the era of globalization.

COVER PHOTOGRAPH:

The Sphere (New York City, Battery Park)

"The Sphere" was created by German sculptor Fritz Koenig as a symbol of world peace through world trade. For thirty years it had stood in the middle of Austin J. Tobin Plaza, the area between the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City's Lower Manhattan. It was recovered from the rubble resulting from the terrorist attacks and ultimate collapse of the twin towers on September 11, 2001, and has been temporarily relocated to Battery Park (without repairs and with an eternal flame placed in the foreground) and rededicated to the victims of the attacks.

Copyright © 2011 Center for Systemic Peace

Global Report 2011

Conflict, Governance, and
State Fragility

Monty G. Marshall


Benjamin R. Cole



Center for Systemic Peace

Publication Date: December 1, 2011

Copyright © 2011 Center for Systemic Peace
Vienna, VA USA
www.systemicpeace.org



All ecosystems are exposed to gradual changes...Nature is usually assumed to respond to gradual change in a smooth way.

However...smooth change can be interrupted by sudden drastic switches to a contrasting state. Although diverse events can trigger such shifts, recent studies show that a loss of resilience usually paves the way for a switch to an alternative [adverse] state.

This suggests that strategies for sustainable management of such ecosystems should focus on [building and] maintaining resilience....Stability domains typically depend on slowly changing variables...These factors may be predicted, monitored, and modified. In contrast, stochastic events that trigger state shifts are usually difficult to predict or control.

-- Marten Scheffer, Steve Carpenter, Jonathan A. Foley, Carl Folke, and Brian Walker. "Catastrophic Shifts in Ecosystems," *Nature* 413 (11 October 2001), pp. 591 and 596

THE GLOBAL SYSTEM AND THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

With the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and the subsequent, voluntary dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 31, 1991, the "globalism" that had characterized international politics since the establishment of the sovereign state system at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and its formalization in the Concert of Europe in 1815 gave way to a much more

profound "era of globalization." Globalism here refers to the ability of the world's more developed states and societies to project their political influence decisively beyond the confinement of their own sovereign borders to encompass the globe. Such influence was often propelled, and enforced, by military power. The essence of the unilateral, globalist perspective was succinctly captured in Carl von Clausewitz's famous dictum, "War is simply the continuation of politics by other means (*Der*

Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln.” The inherent logic of the globalist perspective culminated in the several, devastating global wars of the Twentieth Century: the First World War (1914-1918), the Second World War (1939-1945), the Cold War (1950-1989), and the Third World War (1954-1990).¹ The transformative moment whereby the World System of States established in 1648 shifted to a proactive Global System is authoritatively punctuated by the demise of the Socialist Bloc, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the promulgation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions condemning aggression by Iraq against Kuwait and authorizing Member States to use “all necessary means” to bring the aggressor into compliance with the general prohibition against war as an instrument of foreign policy.

Of course, unilateralism has not been wholly abandoned by states populating the global system in the era of globalization. The “transformative moment” simply marks a normative shift that can be ignored, violated, abandoned, or supplanted by a more benign or malignant form of regionalism (e.g., Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”). As contrasted with globalism, globalization can be viewed as a symbiotic process of complex societal networking and systemic integration that increases opportunities for mutual or non-exclusive benefits at the holistic, or global, level of association. It is not the intent of this report to examine and discuss the academic question of whether a “global system” exists

¹ The “Third World War” was centered on the emergence of mainly African and Asian territories from political control by European states and characterized by the societal-systemic “diffusion of insecurity” in the establishment of independence in “Third World” states. See, Monty G. Marshall, *Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics* (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999).

or to explain the mechanics of how such a complex system operates. It is reasonable to propose that a global system does exist and, drawing from David Easton, examine the outputs of that “black box” system as a way to gauge the general performance of the system over time.² Societal-systems analysis, used in this report, has been designed from this point-of-view. Available technology largely determines the potential size, associational complexity, and interactive density of viable societal-systems.

Societal-systems analysis focuses on the complex relations between dynamics (human agency and environmental forces) and statics (physical and social attributes, conditions, and structures). Basic societal-systems analysis takes into account the interconnectedness of three fundamental dimensions of societal-systems: governance, conflict, and development (based on the accumulation of both physical and human capital).




Figure 2. Societal-System Triad

The conditions, characteristics, qualities, and prospects of each of the three fundamental dimensions of societal-systems critically affect the other two dimensions to such a degree that it is not possible to meaningfully analyze one dimension without taking the other two dimensions into account. Any change in one dimension

² David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

will have consequences for each of the other dimensions; any limitation or weakness in one of the key dimensions will lessen the prospects for improvement in the other dimensions. Successful performance of a societal-system can be expected to be both incremental and congruent among the key dimensions; unsuccessful performance in complex systems, on the other hand, can reverberate through the system, weakening its delicate webs of human relations, and lead to cascades of ill effects. Societal-system performance, then, depends on the system's capabilities for collective action. Successful improvement of conditions in a societal-system thus requires coordinated changes among all of the key dimensions and throughout the system. With regard to each dimension, change depends on a combination of applied coordination (effectiveness) and voluntary compliance (legitimacy).

Performance evaluation of a societal-system must therefore track conditions in all key dimensions with a view toward both effectiveness and legitimacy. Problems that arise in societal-system dynamics can stem from any of the three fundamental dimensions but will manifest in all three dimensions if the problem is not managed effectively and resolved systemically. The qualities of governance and development must be taken into account when analyzing or leveraging conflict factors. Likewise, the qualities of conflict and governance must be included when examining the potential for development and the conditions of conflict and development critically affect the nature of governance. This approach goes beyond "whole-of-government" approaches as it recognizes that each of the three dimensions extend through the complex societal structures and networks of the system (i.e., civil society) and integrates both "top down" and "bottom up" standpoints, that is, a holistic, societal-systemic approach.

This report provides general, macro-comparative evaluations of contemporary conditions, qualities, and trends over time in the three fundamental dimensions of societal-systems analysis at the global level. These performance evaluations are intended to help inform our audience of the immediate circumstances of the emerging global system and future prospects for stabilizing dynamics and consolidating efficacious policies in the era of globalization.

CONFLICT DIMENSION: GLOBAL TRENDS IN ARMED CONFLICT

The most encompassing observation that can be made regarding global system performance in regard to its conflict dimension concerns the status of major episodes of political violence (armed conflict). These include societal (civil, ethnic, and communal) and interstate (including independence) warfare.³ The global trend in major armed conflict has continued its dramatic decline during the globalization era both in numbers of states affected by major armed conflicts and in total magnitude (figure 3). According to our

³ Interstate and civil wars must have reached a magnitude of over 500 directly-related deaths to be included in the analysis. The magnitude of each "major episode of political violence" (armed conflict) is evaluated according to its comprehensive effects on the state or states directly affected by the warfare, including numbers of combatants and casualties, affected area, dislocated population, and extent of infrastructure damage. It is then assigned a score on a ten-point scale; this value is recorded for each year the war remains active. See Monty G. Marshall, "Measuring the Societal Effects of War," chapter 4 in Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002) for a detailed explanation of the methodology used. A list of the events used in the analysis is posted on the Center for Systemic Peace Web site at www.systemicpeace.org ("War List"). The CSP Web site tracks other aspects of global and regional conflict trends ("Conflict Trends").

calculations, the global magnitude of warfare has decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2010 to its lowest level since 1961.

Societal warfare has been the predominant mode of warfare since the mid-1950s; increasing steeply and steadily through the Cold War period. This steep, linear increase in societal warfare is largely explained by a general tendency toward longer, more protracted, wars during that period; internal wars often received crucial military and/or material support from foreign states and often linked to the competition between the superpowers. On the other hand, the rate of onset of new societal wars has remained constant since 1946 with an average of about four new societal wars per year.

In contrast, the global trend in interstate warfare has remained at a relatively low level since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations

Organization (UN). The UN was specially designed to “maintain international peace and security” without “interven[ing] in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Although there was a moderate increase in interstate wars during the latter years of the Cold War, from 1977 to 1987, like civil warfare, interstate warfare has also declined substantially since the end of the Cold War. Of the interstate wars that took place during the Cold War period, many of the most serious were wars of independence fought during the decolonization of the “third world” during the first half of the Cold War period. Onsets of interstate wars occurred at the rate of about one and one-half events per year. Three-quarters of the sixty-seven interstate wars remained at fairly low levels of violence. The conventional distinction between inter-state and intra-state wars has been blurred by increased global activism directed toward humanitarian operations and the “responsibility to protect” (R2P).




Figure 3. Global Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2010




Figure 4. State Fragility and Warfare in the Global System, mid-2011

High magnitude interstate wars were limited to the several Arab-Israeli wars, the Vietnamese wars, the Afghanistan wars, the Iraqi wars, the India-Pakistan wars, and the recent war between Ethiopia and Eritrea; all except the Iraq-Iran (1980-88) war and the first Gulf War (1990-91) had some domestic, or former-domestic, conflict element (i.e., internationalized civil wars). Over the entire period, since 1946, wars have been quite common: there have been 326 distinct episodes of major armed conflict in the world's 164 countries. During the past twenty-five years (since 1986), over one-half of all countries have experienced some major armed conflict (83 of 164 countries; in addition, the armed conflict in the Comoros islands, though relatively "major," did not reach 500 deaths).

In late 2011, there were twenty-one countries experiencing major armed conflicts within their territory (see figure 4; denoted by diamond icons); all of these are

beset by societal warfare: Mexico, Colombia, Nigeria (north), Chad, Central African Republic, Sudan (Darfur and south Sudan), Democratic Republic of Congo (northeast), Ethiopia (Ogaden), Somalia, Yemen, Israel (Gaza), Iraq, Syria, Turkey (Kurds), Russia (eastern Transcaucasus), Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (Kashmir, Maoist, and Assam), Myanmar (various non-Burman groups), Thailand (Malays), and the Philippines (Moro). Four of the current, major armed conflicts have a substantial drug production and trafficking component: Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and Myanmar (Burma). The several episodes of warfare plaguing the central and eastern Africa region involve roving militias and cross-border tensions. Militants from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi take refuge and continue to create havoc in the northeastern DRC and southern Sudan. The global mapping of "State Fragility and Warfare in the Global System" (figure 4) indicates that state fragility and warfare are

closely connected, topics that will be examined in more detail later in this report.

The fifteen “recently ended” wars are numerically tagged on the map. In many of these locations, political tensions and/or low level violence continue to challenge state authorities. “Recently ended” conflicts include those in 1) United States (al Qaeda, Iraq, and Afghanistan); 2) Haiti; 3) Russia (Chechnya); 4) Georgia-Russia; 5) Lebanon; 6) Egypt; 7) Libya; 8) Ivory Coast; 9) Nigeria (Delta); 10) Uganda; 11) Kenya; 12) Saudi Arabia; 13) Sri Lanka (Tamils); 14) Nepal; and 15) Kyrgyzstan. The “down side” of the dramatic decrease in the general magnitude of armed conflict in the global system since the early 1990s is a dramatic increase in the number of post-war “recovery” states.

War ravaged societies are highly prone to humanitarian crises and are in dire need of broad-based assistance. Perhaps the greatest challenge in post-war recovery is the over-supply of arms and skilled militants under conditions ripe for economic exploitation and the expansion of organized crime. Of course, countries bordering on war-torn and war-recovery states experience serious diffusion and spillover effects that further increase and expand the reach of organized crime, stimulate political tensions and corruption, increase local and regional insecurity, challenge local authorities, and overwhelm the already severely limited provision of crucial social services.

One of the current wars in remission has been touted as a “global war” (the “global war on terrorism” led by the United States); in terms of systematic and sustained attacks, however, that “global war” has been confined almost entirely to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan (see figure 5).⁴ Increased

⁴ The six-month periods run from September 11 to March 10 and from March 11 to September 10; the

armed conflict in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen in 2010 and 2011 indicate that the largely localized, foreign interventionary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be fueling or are otherwise symptomatic of a larger, regional conflict, although that activity appears to be diminishing in late 2011. There have been increases in militant activity in almost all areas along the periphery of the Muslim region. Islamic militants are almost entirely responsible for the dramatic increase in “high casualty terrorist bombings” (HCTB) since September 2001 (i.e., bombings by non-state actors resulting in fifteen or more deaths; figure 5). These bombings killing and maiming mainly non-combatants are very often directed at a specific political target. HCTB events have been concentrated in Muslim countries and in Muslim-majority regions in neighboring countries and the vast majority of casualties that have occurred have been among local, fellow-Muslims. To be fair, foreign interventionary forces have relied heavily on aerial and “drone” bomb attacks in these same theaters of warfare and non-combatants often figure prominently among the resulting casualties (see note 5, below).

While the frequency and lethality of “international terrorism” does not appear to have increased much in recent years and, in any case, remains at extremely low levels when compared with any other form of political or criminal violence, the tactical use of “low-tech, smart bombs” (mainly car bombs and suicide bombers)

latter period is denoted by the “y” marker on the horizontal axis. Terrorist attacks have occurred throughout the predominately Muslim region stretching from northwestern Africa through the Middle East and in the Muslim areas of southeastern Asia and Oceania. However, there is scant evidence that Islamic militants have established a “global reach” capability for systematic and sustained attacks beyond the Muslim region itself.




Figure 5. Deaths from High Casualty Terrorist Bombings, 9/11/1991–9/10/2011

against "soft targets" (mainly political and civilian targets) has increased dramatically since the 9/11/01 attacks (in which 2,982 people were killed). However, most of the increase in these high profile terrorist attacks have been confined to a handful of localities: Russia, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Israel, and, especially, Iraq (there has not been an HCTB event in Israel since August 2004 and there had not been an attack in Russia since the Beslan attack on September 1, 2004, until August 2009).

While the rise of the "super-empowered terrorist" as an innovation in tactical or criminal violence is certainly a disturbing trend, the evidence shows that it remained an extreme and relatively rare event, outside the extremist nightmare that has engulfed Iraq since mid-2003. HCTB attacks have killed more than 26,000 people since the 9/11 events, with sixty percent of the killings having taken place in Iraq. The frequency of HCTB attacks in Iraq decreased dramatically beginning in September 2007, falling to less than 20% of

the toll at the peak of HCTB attacks (falling from 2677 to 512). The number of HCTB deaths in Iraq has remained fairly steady since 2007, with numbers varying between 500 and 1000 in each 6-month period since the peak. HCTB attacks in Pakistan have increased dramatically since 2007 and, especially, in late 2009 in conjunction with the government's military offensive against Taliban and al Qaeda strongholds.⁵

⁵ Armed assaults on civilian targets that use firearms or other hand-held weapons (such as the November 2008 assault on Mumbai, India, that resulted in 173 deaths) are not included in this collection. The numbers of deaths attributed to "death squad" activities often far surpasses the death totals of the HCTB events recorded here. Since 2009, the US has used unmanned "drone" aircraft to strike targets in Pakistan. By way of comparison, using the same 15 death threshold to define "high casualty drone attacks" (HCDA), we see that over the past three years, 2009-2011, in Pakistan there have been 798 killed in 32 HCDA events and 2,642 killed in 69 HCTB events (according to data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal web site, www.satp.org).

As mentioned, the several loosely aligned armed conflicts comprising the “global war on terror” stand as a serious challenge to progressive globalization. These conflicts have the potential for escalating to a more conventional regional war: Pakistan has already been drawn in, Russia and Turkey have been drawn back in, and Algeria is experiencing continued low-level violence. Egypt, Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia are also experiencing serious spillover effects from armed conflicts in this region. Increasing competition over oil supplies can only complicate, if not directly fuel, conflict dynamics in this region, just as disputes over property rights and revenue shares from more recently discovered and exploited oil reserves have complicated conflict dynamics in many African countries, such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Sri Lanka’s adoption of “total war” tactics in defeating Tamil (LTTE) separatists in 2009 has been touted by some as an example of “effective” resolution for long-standing armed societal wars. Such an extreme approach to “effective resolution” requires serious reflection on what constitutes the effective prosecution of military victory and the systemic consequences of such victory. Donor fatigue and engagement frustration over the long course of recovery and development in the “global ghettos” may contribute to acquiescence in favor of, or even support for, more extreme solutions to intractable conflicts, greater neglect of the more insoluble development problems, and acceptance of repressive and predatory governance. The military prosecution of societal conflict has always played out on an unlevel “playing field” and military “victory” in such asymmetrical contests, while ending the fighting, has generally resulted in severe consequences for civilian populations and favored an uncompromising maintenance of the status quo.

GOVERNANCE DIMENSION: GLOBAL TRENDS IN GOVERNANCE

Democracy and autocracy are commonly viewed as contrasting and distinct forms of governance. Principal differences are found in the ways executive power is acquired and transferred, how political power is exercised and constrained, how social order is defined and maintained, and how much influence public interests and opinion have on the decision making process. Despite fundamental differences, these two ideal forms of governance are often perceived as comparably stable and effective in maintaining social order. In real terms, however, different countries have different mixes and qualities of governing authority; the ideal types are rarely observed in practice. Even though some countries may have mixed features of openness, competitiveness, and regulation, the core qualities of democracy and autocracy can be viewed as defining opposite ends of a governance scale. Our Polity IV Project has rated the levels of both democracy and autocracy for each country and year using coded information on the general qualities of political institutions and processes, including executive recruitment, constraints on executive action, and political competition. These ratings have been combined into a single, scaled measure of regime governance: the *Polity* score. The *Polity* scale ranges from -10, fully institutionalized autocracy, to +10, fully institutionalized democracy.⁶ A perfect +10 *democracy*, like Australia, Greece, or Sweden,

⁶ The Polity IV data set was originally designed by Ted Robert Gurr in the early 1970s and, since 1998, is directed by Monty G. Marshall at the Center for Systemic Peace. The Polity data series comprises annually coded information on the qualities of institutionalized regime authority for all independent countries (not including micro-states) from 1800 through 2010 and is updated annually. The Polity IV data series is available on the Center for Systemic Peace Web site (“Polity IV”).

has institutionalized procedures for open, competitive, and deliberative political participation; chooses and replaces chief executives in open, competitive elections; and imposes substantial checks and balances on the discretionary powers of the chief executive. Countries with *Polity* scores from +6 to +10 are counted as democracies in tracking “Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2010” (figure 6). Elected governments that fall short of a perfect +10, like Bolivia, Mozambique, Turkey, or Indonesia, may have weaker checks on executive power, some restrictions on political participation, or shortcomings in the application of the rule of law to, or by, opposition groups.

In a perfect -10 *autocracy*, by contrast, citizens’ participation is sharply restricted or suppressed; chief executives are selected according to clearly defined (usually hereditary) rules of succession from within the established political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with no meaningful checks from legislative, judicial, or civil society institutions. Only Saudi Arabia and Qatar are rated as fully institutionalized autocracies in late 2011. Other monarchies, such as those in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Swaziland, share some powers with elected officials. In general, except for a strong presence in the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula, hereditary monarchy has nearly disappeared as a form of governance in the early 21st century. Autocratic governance at the turn of the century is far more likely to be characterized by the authoritarian rule of personalistic leaders, military juntas, or one-party structures; Belarus, Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam are examples of these non-monarchical autocracies. Besides having less-clearly defined rules of succession, less-than-perfect autocracies may allow some space for political participation or impose some effective limits on executive authority; examples include Syria, China, and Zimbabwe. Countries with *Polity* scores

from -10 to -6 are counted as autocracies in figure 6. Curiously, several personalistic autocracies, such as North Korea, Syria, Togo, Azerbaijan, and Gabon, have adopted dynastic succession in executive leadership in order to forestall succession crises.

Anocracy, on the other hand, is characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity. Anocratic regimes very often reflect inherent qualities of instability or ineffectiveness and are especially vulnerable to the onset of new political instability events, such as outbreaks of armed conflict, unexpected changes in leadership, or adverse regime changes (e.g., a seizure of power by a personalistic or military leader).

Anocracies are a middling category rather than a distinct form of governance. They are countries whose governments are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic but, rather, combine an, often, incoherent mix of democratic and autocratic traits and practices. Their *Polity* scores range from -5 to +5.⁷ Some such countries have succeeded in establishing democracy following a staged transition from autocracy through anocracy, as in Mexico, Nicaragua, Senegal, and Taiwan. A number of African and a few Middle Eastern countries have recently begun a cautious transition to greater openness, among them Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ghana, Jordan, and Tanzania.

⁷ Also included in the anocracy category in this treatment are countries that are administered by transitional governments (coded “-88” in the Polity IV dataset), countries where central authority has collapsed or lost control over a majority of its territory (coded “-77”), and countries where foreign authorities, backed by the presence of foreign forces, provide a superordinate support structure for maintaining local authority (coded “-66”). As mentioned, the Polity IV dataset does not include information on micro-states; a state must have reached a total population of 500,000 to be included in the data series.

Ivory Coast appeared to be headed on a similar course before stumbling (in 2002) into civil war and regime failure; Iran reversed the course of democratic reforms and tightened autocratic control in 2004; Guinea has been wavering noticeably since the death of President Lansana Conté in late-December 2008. Many governments have a mix of democratic and autocratic features, for example holding competitive elections for a legislature that exercises little effective control on the executive branch or allowing open political competition among some social groups while seriously restricting participation of other groups.

There are many reasons why countries may come to be characterized by such inconsistencies, or incoherence, in

governance. Some countries may be implementing a staged transition from autocracy to greater democracy; others may institute piecemeal reforms due to increasing demands from emerging political groups; others may be weakened by corruption or dissension and losing their capacity to maintain strict political controls and suppress dissent. Societal conflict and factionalism often undermine democratic experiments: some regimes may be unable to fully institutionalize reforms due to serious disagreements among social groups or key political elites; some may harden their institutions in response to political crises or due to the personal ambitions of opportunistic leaders; and others may simply lose control of the political dynamics that enable, or disable, effective governance.




Figure 6. Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2010

Whereas democracy and autocracy are very different forms and strategies of governance, they are very similar in their general capacity to maintain central authority, articulate a policy agenda, and manage political dynamics *over the near term*

(autocracies are much more susceptible to armed insurrections and separatism over the longer term). Some anocracies have been able to manage conflict between deeply-divided social groups for substantial periods of time through the use of restrictions on

political participation as in Russia, Malaysia, and Venezuela. This also appears to be the strategy adopted recently in Fiji to limit political influence by ethnic-Indians (until that policy was challenged by a military coup in late 2006) and in Iraq. Other anocracies are the result of failed transitions to greater democracy, as currently in Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, and Uganda. Anocracies can be further classified into three sub-groupings: “open” anocracies (*Polity* scores from +1 to +5); “closed” anocracies (*Polity* scores from -5 to 0); and failed or occupation regimes (*Polity* codes -77 and -66), as they have been in the mapping of governance regimes in 2011 (figure 7, below).

In 1946, there were seventy-one independent states comprising the world’s system of states (figure 6). Of these, twenty (20) countries were ruled by democratic

regimes and nineteen (19) by autocratic regimes; thirty-two (32) countries were subject to anocratic regimes. The high proportion of anocratic regimes was largely a consequence of the severe devastation and disruptions resulting from the Second World War.

The Second World War was a watershed event for globalism as the Nazi “totalitarian” concept of “total war” made modern warfare a global systemic problem. And it was during the Nuremberg Tribunals following the war at which the victors of the war finally determined that aggressive war is a crime that must be prohibited (crime of war); that the conduct of war establishes criminal liabilities (war crimes); and that the intentional targeting of non-combatant populations in war must be universally condemned (crimes against humanity).




Figure 7. Distribution of Governance Regimes in the Global System, 2011

One direct consequence of the devastation of Europe and the criminalization of war and empire was a serious erosion of European control over its colonial

territories in Asia and Africa. Many new states gained independence in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, doubling the number of states in the world by 1975.

During this period of decolonization, there was a dramatic increase in the number of autocratic regimes: to a peak of eighty-nine (89) autocracies in 1977. Although new states were about as likely to adopt democratic as autocratic forms of governance upon gaining independence, problems of manageability caused most new, democratic regimes to fail within ten years and give way to autocratic rule. Newly independent and underdeveloped states proved particularly difficult to manage.

A second consequence of the technological intensification and expansion of classical war to its modern form as “total war” was the broadening and deepening of political participation in modern states. The demands of modern, systemic warfare brought about the integration of women in the workforce and the more active mobilization of both civil society and marginal sectors in supporting the war effort. Expanding the political franchise to include women in the world’s “advanced industrial economies” only began in the period following the First World War and was only completed following the Second World War. The extension of the political franchise to involve the marginalized sectors of societal-systems was the objective of the Civil Rights Movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s in the United States. The end result was the general acceptance of the principle of universal suffrage in practice. The principle of universal suffrage has, at once, 1) accelerated the discreditation and dismantling of autocratic regimes (rendering them largely obsolete in the modern, global system) and 2) increased the societal complexities and management difficulties associated with, and integral to, regime transitions from autocratic to democratic governance.

A dramatic shift away from rigidly autocratic regimes and toward more open governance began in 1990. This “rush

toward democratization” was led by Latin American countries and the former-Socialist countries of Eastern Europe; these regions were largely comprised of “old” and fairly well-developed states rather than newly independent ones. During the Cold War period, there had been a steady increase in the number of democracies at the rate of about one new democracy every two years. During the early 1990s, the number of democracies increased by thirty (30) in five years (from 48 in 1989 to 77 in 1994). There was a similar increase in the number of incomplete transitions toward democracy, as the number of anocracies rose from twenty-nine (29) to forty-eight (48); that number has remained fairly constant through 2011. The number of autocracies continues to plummet: from the peak of eighty-nine (89) in 1977 to just twenty-two in late 2011. There are ninety-five (95) countries classified as democracies in late 2011. The one thing that most clearly distinguishes the Globalization Era is that, for the first time in human history, the global system is predominantly comprised of independent states and populated by democratic regimes.

While we view the major global shift toward greater democracy as a very important and generally positive trend, the sharp increase in the number of anocracies concurrent with the end of the Cold War is cause for concern. Research indicates that anocracies have been highly unstable and transitory regimes, with over fifty percent experiencing a major regime change within five years and over seventy percent within ten years. Anocracies have been much more vulnerable to new outbreaks of armed societal conflict; they have been about six times more likely than democracies and two and one-half times as likely as autocracies to experience new outbreaks of societal wars. Anocracies have also been about three times more susceptible to autocratic “backsliding” than democracies; they are four times more likely than democracies to experience coup

plots and about one and one-half times more vulnerable to coups than autocracies.

However, a “new truth” may be emerging regarding the vulnerability of anocratic regimes in the Globalization Era. In the past nineteen years, there have been far fewer failures of anocratic regimes than would be expected from the historical trends. Despite the dramatic rise and continued high numbers of anocratic regimes, with their attendant problems of manageability and poor governance, there has been no increase in the rate of onsets of societal wars (just less than four per year) or lapses into autocratic rule. We believe that the change in outcome trends for anocratic regimes is attributable to a post-Cold War “peace dividend” and explained largely due to

- notable increases in proactive international (global) engagement (particularly, conflict mediation, election monitoring, accountability guarantees, NGO activity, direct investment, and foreign assistance);
- improved public capabilities, attitudes, and expectations (the local “peace dividend,” examined in more detailed in the following section on state fragility);
- a lessening of political activism within more professionalized militaries, which have been far less likely to intervene directly in politics or support forceful repression of public challenges to ruling elites; and
- increased, expanded, and prolonged management challenges associated with the full incorporation of the complexities and demands associated with universal enfranchisement and the requirements of technological expertise in effecting successful regime transitions from autocratic to democratic governance in developing societal-systems.

In short, democratic transitions have become more complicated and, so, require

greater and more protracted effort, and support, to accomplish and consolidate. Transition periods, and the anocratic regimes associated with such transitions, then, tend to last longer than they had in the past, particularly in societal-systems with little or no previous experience in democratic governance.

Counter-examples have occurred recently as military coups have ousted elected governments in Thailand and Fiji in late 2006, Bangladesh in 2007, and Mauritania in 2008; both Thailand and Bangladesh have returned to some measure of parliamentary rule by 2011. Militaries have also been instrumental in forcing the resignations of elected presidents in Honduras and Madagascar in 2009. In contrast to the apparent, general successes of proactive global engagement in the post-Cold War environment, foreign military interventions have had mixed or less favorable outcomes, in general, as these have resulted in several, seemingly interminable foreign occupations: Bosnia (since 1995); Kosovo (since 1999); Afghanistan (since 2001); and Iraq (since 2003, ending in 2011); continuing territorial disputes: Trans-Dniester in Moldova; Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan; and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia; and hotly contested independence referendums: East Timor (2001), Kosovo (2008), and South Sudan (2011).

Widespread democratization pressures and demands for broad-based societal reforms within the dynamic context of pushback from entrenched, autocratic elites can, and sometimes do, lead to cascade effects whereby social and political movements for change in the status quo in different countries diffuse, link up, and stimulate greater local efforts in regional, political and security complexes. This systemic dynamic has been greatly facilitated by technological advances in communication and the global spread of access to social media.

Complexity and Cascade Effects: A general theme of the *Global Report* series is the complex, interconnectedness of social groupings and networks in societal-systems and their linkages across traditional political boundaries in the formation of regional and global dynamic systems. The importance of social networks and organizations in defining, refining, and driving the development of social structures and dynamics is generally recognized in the social sciences. Societal-system development, then, can be measured by the expansion of “associational ties and interaction densities” and the “movement of change in societal relations toward a maximal reliance on associative linkages and non-violent conflict management strategies and a minimal reliance on instrumental coercion and crisis management strategies.”⁸ In brief, it is proposed that, as societal-systems develop, “stakeholder” civil society organizations and interactions evolve as a function of system complexity and operate to complement the state and mediate between the state and the “non-stakeholder” marginal sectors of society to reduce the system’s inherently destructive “revolutionary potential” and increase its intrinsically constructive and progressive “democratization potential” (refer to the “Societal-Systems” conceptual model on page 1, above).

In short, the democratization process in any societal-system is triggered by circumstances and manifests from its democratization potential; democratization is an essential and necessary conflict management function of increasing systemic complexity which is, in turn, both a corollary and a consequence of the systemic development process. In contrast, the revolutionary process in societal-systems is a radical, crisis

management function that is associated with systemic underdevelopment; revolutionary potential is politicized by the intransigence of the state of the state in response to the mobilization of civil society and its increasing demands for progressive societal integration. The revolutionary process is articulated through social support structures in the marginal sectors and organized by disaffected elements of civil society. The revolutionary process (i.e., the manifestation of revolutionary potential as instrumental political action) challenges state authority and diminishes democratization potential. The logical outcomes of the revolutionary process in societal-systems are three: 1) strengthening of the state’s intransigence as the state acts forcefully to resist, or implement, the revolutionary challenge; 2) forestalling and prolonging the course of democratization as civil society bears the systemic costs of the revolutionary process; and 3) forcing the partial, or full, collapse of state authority as revolutionary forces succeed in destroying state capacity.

While development is an inherent function of societal-systems, the course of systemic development is largely determined by the system’s unique, local mix of endowments and circumstances. However, local development dynamics take place within a larger, systemic context; the internal dynamics of societal-systems are increasing influenced by external dynamics. In the Era of Globalization no societal-system can be viewed as developing independently from the larger regional and global systems. The (partial) isolation of individual societal-systems from their systemic context comes at great cost. Social networking and organization at the regional and global levels has proceeded apace the development of social networks and organizations at the local level. States have long acted to extend their influence outside their borders; global civil society has increased its scope dramatically since the end of World War II.

⁸ Marshall, *Third World War*, chapter 3, “The Societal Dimensions of ‘Human Nature’ and the Dynamics of Group Conflict” (pp. 80, 87-88)




Figure 8. Increase in the Numbers of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), 1909-2009

With the establishment of the United Nations Organization in 1945, the interactions and influences of states have become increasingly regularized and regulated by international inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and particularly since the thaw in relations between the Socialist Bloc and the West in the 1980s (figure 8; see, also, the “Societal-Systems” model on page 1). The global expansion in the numbers of IGOs has been paralleled by a dramatic expansion in the numbers and types of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and transnational advocacy networks (TANs). These developments can be viewed as the emergence of the structures and dynamics of global and regional governance and civil society and this emergence can be understood as a development function of greater global system complexity.

Interaction densities, while structured by organizations, are transmitted through the prevailing media. Globalization has been empowered and conveyed through an

accelerating and expanding series of technological innovations in transportation, broadcast communication, and information-computation resources. Globalization began with advances in transportation, expanded through radio and television broadcasting, and has intensified with the advent of digital-electronic networking.

Autocratic authority critically depends upon command and control of information and media in order to fabricate loyalty, dampen the politicization of dissent, and prevent the mobilization of opposition. As we have argued above, the general development of societal-systems has increased both system complexity and democratization potential; these changes, in turn, have altered the incentive structure for the state to broaden its support base and compliance with the rule of law by progressively incorporating civil society into the governance system. The democratization process increases access, responsiveness, accountability, and innovation within the societal-system, making autocratic authority obsolete.




Figure 9. Changes in Subscription Rates for Cell Phones and Internet by Regime Type, 1999 and 2009 (International Telecommunications Union, www.itu.int)

As already mentioned, there were only twenty-two (22) institutionalized autocratic regimes in the global system in late 2011. These include an odd mixture of isolationist regimes, communist and former-communist countries, traditional monarchies, and wealthy oil-producing states. Only one autocracy is among the world’s poorest countries: Eritrea. The traditional link between underdevelopment and autocratic rule was broken with the collapse of communism as the world’s poorest and most dependent countries reformed their autocratic systems as an explicit condition for gaining development assistance from largely democratic donor countries. The remaining autocracies are mainly middle and upper income countries that are, like their middle and upper income democratic counterparts, becoming increasing “tech savvy,” “wired,” and “wireless.” As such, they may be sowing the seeds of their own reformation. Figure 9 provides a graphic display of the profound changes in

electronic connectivity that is sweeping the global system in the early years of the 21st century. Rather than maintaining strict control of social networking technologies, “closed” autocracies appear to have embraced them to a degree that rivals that of the “open” democracies.

The post-Cold War surge in democracies and democratization processes has transformed the global system in the era of globalization to a democracy-predominant system. This transformation is connected to generalized societal-system development and robust complexity and is currently characterized by four, prominent systemic cascade effects. Systemic complexity and interconnectivity create the conditions for regional cascades of systemic change, the result of which is a relatively swift sequence of similar and related changes among societal-systems with high levels of “neighborhood” connectivity and shared circumstances and interests.

Initial evidence of systemic cascade effects in the transformation of governance systems in the globalization era can be found in South America beginning in the late 1970s. South American countries had a fairly long history of experiments with democratic authority and, so, that cascade of democratization was not “shockingly” remarkable. There had also been only limited societal warfare in South America, except for the violence that pervaded the illicit drug producing and trafficking countries of Colombia and Peru. The countries of Central America have a similar history of democratic trials and show evidence of a two-step cascade effect beginning in the late 1970s and continuing in the late 1980s, hampered by the severe societal warfare that had engulfed Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.⁹

A second cascade of democratization became evident in the East European region in the late 1980s. The countries of Eastern Europe had relatively vibrant civil societies and several states also had prior experience with democratic authority; however, this history was overshadowed by the devastation of the Second World War and the veil of communism. When change began in Eastern Europe and spread to the Soviet Union, it was seen as a profound change that was contrary to deeply held beliefs and the vestiges of fear that pervaded East-West relations in the Cold War aftermath of their descent into “total war.” Europe experienced no serious episodes of societal warfare during the latter half of the 20th century, after the 1945-49 Greek civil war and 1956 Hungarian rebellion and until the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia beginning in 1991.

⁹ Polity IV “Regional Trends in Governance” graphs for the period 1946-2010 can be found on the Polity IV Project and the Polity IV Country Reports pages of the Center for Systemic Peace web site (www.systemicpeace.org).

A third cascade followed the “collapse of communism” and the ending of the Cold War. As mentioned, the newly independent, underdeveloped, and foreign aid-dependent societal-systems of Sub-Saharan Africa were almost uniformly enticed by donors and the agents of the emerging, global civil society to abandon autocratic rule and implement democratic reforms. As most of these counties were poor, many had experienced brutal conflicts, and few had substantive experience with democratic governance, the democratization processes in Sub-Saharan Africa are incomplete and remain vulnerable to disturbance and instability; African regimes remain largely anocratic as a result. Both their democratization and development processes continue to be dependent on continued and consistent infusions of donor support and humanitarian assistance.

Given the generalized, global trends and broad scope of systemic changes that define the emerging era of globalization, the main issue should not be concerned with explaining why such changes have occurred in the regions in which they have taken place but, rather, why these changes have not yet occurred in the regions where they have not yet taken place: that is, middle belt of the Eastern Hemisphere that extends from northwest Africa across the Middle East and through to Central and East Asia.

A fourth cascade of democratization appears to be unfolding presently in the Arab League countries that span North Africa and the Middle East. The now popularly termed “Arab Spring” can be understood to have initially emerged in October 1988 in Algeria when mass demonstrations against the FLN one-party regime triggered an immediate, repressive response by the state but, then, led to the holding of Algeria’s first multi-party legislative elections in December 1991. A landslide victory at the polls by the Islamic

Salvation Front (FIS) was thwarted by an abrupt military takeover which, in turn, triggered a brutal, 15-year civil war. The failed Algerian experiment with democracy, like the nascent democratization movement in China that was crushed in Tiananmen Square in 1989, contributed to a general dampening of the democratization process across the surrounding regions. In the Arab League countries over the next twenty years,

we see a gradual decline in autocratic rule due to some piecemeal reforms. The East Asia region shows a very gradual shift toward democratization since 1989, with Taiwan and Mongolia making solid strides and Bangladesh and Thailand experiencing halting progress. Indonesia managed its democratic transition in the late 1990s and it appears that Malaysia may be poised to allow effective electoral competition.




Figure 10. Regional Trends in Armed Conflict (a) and Governance (b) for the Arab League Countries, 1946-2011

It is in the “Arab Spring” that we can see most vividly the complex influences of the larger global system upon local and regional dynamics. Cascades of democratic change in Latin America and Eastern Europe occurred largely as a natural expression of local and regional development processes in those regions. Shifts in the nature of external influences upon those regions are notable but not definitive. The opening and softening of the communist bloc was certainly encouraged by the Western alliance and the subsequent democratization processes that spread through Eastern Europe were critically aided and guided by Western expertise. The softening and eventual collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, then, can be seen to erode “anti-communism” rationale for military activism in Latin America and lead to the integration of local populism in electoral politics there.

As already noted, democratization in the Sub-Saharan Africa region was largely induced through their dependency on foreign assistance and at the insistence of the democratic donor community. Local and regional development processes are neither generally congruent with nor conducive to the democratization process there. Armed conflict and violence continue to be pervasive in many areas and civil society is both resource-poor and poorly organized (in both relative and absolute terms, given that states in the region are also generally resource-poor and poorly organized). As such, democratic reforms are partial, incomplete, and highly vulnerable to changes in local conditions and dynamics.

Since the end of the Cold War, no region of the global system has been subject to the intensity of international interest and

influence as has the region comprised by the Arab League countries. And nowhere, since the transformation of anti-communism in Latin America, has the “siren call” of anti-populism been so ardently promoted by foreign interests as in the Islamic countries, of which the Arab League is a principal component. Current external interest in Arab politics stems from four principle issues: 1) **oil** (11 of the 22 members of the Arab League are net oil exporters and contain over 50% of the world’s proven oil reserves); 2) **Palestine** (the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine has defied resolution since 1946); 3) **Iran** (Iran’s Shia-Islamic theocracy has pursued an anti-West foreign policy since the fall of the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979; Iran has been particularly influential with Shia sectarian groups in Arab countries); and 4) **al Qaeda** (xenophobic radicalism and extremism in Islamic countries has been loosely organized by al Qaeda which promotes a decidedly anti-West and revolutionary agenda). External influences in the Arab countries are complex and profound and offer the most potent explanations for the inhibition and delay of democratization processes in the Arab countries. (Similarly, the internal reticence and regional influence of China largely explains the slow pace of democratic reform in East Asia.)

Contemporary regional trends in armed conflict and governance for the Arab League countries are provided in figures 10a and 10b (above). While both trends show evidence that the Arab region is responsive to general, global trends, there are some important differences that may help us to understand recent changes in the region and their future prospects. Like the global trend, the regional trend in societal warfare can be seen to increase linearly through the Cold War period and decrease thereafter. Unlike the global trend, however, societal warfare has increased dramatically coincident with the advent of the Arab Spring in January

2011. Violent societal conflicts have broken out in Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen in 2011. Perhaps of greater concern is the relative proclivity of the Arab region for interstate warfare, a type of warfare that holds far greater potential for destruction and contagion than societal warfare and a type of warfare that the global system has been able to prevent, for the most part, since the establishment of the UN System.

Moving to the regional trend in governance (figure 10b) we can see that the generalized, global movement away from autocratic regimes since the mid-1980s is also evident in the Arab countries. What is starkly missing, however, are transitions to democratic regimes. Countries in the Arab region have very limited experience with democratic governance: only Comoros, Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria have supported democratic regimes since 1946 and none have persisted for more than ten years. Currently democratic regimes are found in Comoros and Lebanon; Tunisia has elected a constituent assembly and transitional government that assumed governing authority in November 2011.

Autocratic regimes are largely confined to the “oil emirates” of the Arabian Peninsula: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; the Moroccan monarchy is currently under domestic pressure to institute constitutional reforms and the Alawite-minority regime in Syria is experiencing widespread dissent and conducting a violent crackdown in late 2011, mainly involving urban, Sunni-majority groups. The autocratic rule of Moammar Ghaddafi in Libya was violently overthrown in October 2011 by rebel forces with considerable air support from NATO forces; the nature of the successive regime there will depend on who establishes what kind of control over Libya’s oil revenues and how those revenues are distributed among Libya’s multiple, contending,

militant clans. The leading movements in the current iteration of the Arab Spring democratization process, Tunisia and Egypt, have had quite contrasting experiences. The Tunisian reform process has proceeded relatively quickly and smoothly, although the mandated drafting of a new constitution will undoubtedly challenge the newly established transitional government. The relative strength and political activism of the Egyptian military present enormous challenges for the democratization process in that country, which has the Arab region's largest population.

Seriously complicating conflict, governance, and development dynamics in the Arab countries is the region's maldistribution of income whereby ten percent of the region's population lives in rigidly autocratic states which control fifty percent of the region's income, almost exclusively derived from oil export revenues. Given the importance of broad, systemic support for democratic transition processes to both proceed and succeed, the severe disconnect between income and governance in the Arab League is cause for great concern. The hesitance, or outright refusal, of the region's "oil emirates" to allow for the development of civil society and provide crucial economic and logistic support for democratization efforts will severely handicap regional prospects and increase the burden on Western donors who are committed to foster democratic change in the region outside the Arabian Peninsula.

DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION: GLOBAL TRENDS IN STATE FRAGILITY

The third major focus of this *Global Report* series is on global development and the general performance of the economic (material capital) and social welfare (human capital) aspects of globalization and the global system. The initial (2007) *Global*

Report highlighted the great, regional (and, in some cases, intra-regional) disparities in economic development and the systemic distribution of income. It highlighted the contrast between the better-performing sub-systems, populated by net-consumers of energy resources, and the poorer-performing sub-systems, which are characterized by great income disparities between the resource-rich (often, net-producers of petroleum) countries and the resource-poor countries. The report raised serious concerns regarding the level of tensions that would likely occur in a global system characterized by relatively small, powerful, resource-demanding regions and large, weak, resource-producing regions. "It would seem that the potential for polarization and factionalism in such a system is quite high and, given the evidence that the 'income gap' is narrowing only slowly, will remain high for the foreseeable future." The report concluded by presenting three challenges for the emerging era of globalization: "one is narrowing the divide between 'well being' and 'fragility' in constituent societies; a second is calming the voices of opposition and transforming their creativity and energy to promote rather than disrupt the global system; and a third is to recognize the full, disruptive potential of our growing dependence on petroleum and accept this as a global dilemma, requiring a global solution."¹⁰

In this third section, we highlight measured changes in our State Fragility Index and Matrix from 1995 to 2010 in order to gain a better understanding of progress being made toward addressing the first challenge, that is, "narrowing the divide between 'well being' and 'fragility' in constituent

¹⁰ Monty G. Marshall and Jack Goldstone, "Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007: Gauging System Performance and Fragility in the Globalization Era," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 17.1 (Winter 2007):3-21, p. 11.

societies.” We then conclude *Global Report 2011* by presenting our most recent State Fragility assessments for each of the 164 countries (with populations greater than 500,000) that constitute the global system in late 2011. The 2010 State Fragility Index and Matrix (table 1, following) rates each country according to its level of fragility in both effectiveness and legitimacy across four distinct dimensions: security, governance, economic development, and social development.

Global Summary of Changes in State Fragility: In keeping with the global system perspective of this report, we examine changes in State Fragility across the period of study, 1995-2010, through a global system lens and summarize the results in figure 11, following. The chart displays aggregate changes in fragility indices and component indicators and is organized in the same fashion as the State Fragility Matrix (table 1, following) in order to facilitate comparison.

As already noted, the year 1995 was chosen as our starting point because it is well within the post-Cold War period (which we set as beginning in 1991) and it is a year for which we have full, annual data coverage on the relevant indicators used to construct the Fragility Matrix. The State Fragility design uses quintile cutpoints for the continuous measures used (such as income, infant mortality, and human development) in order to demarcate ordinal categories. The cutpoints are set using 2004 as the baseline year so that change can be measured as a constant and comparative function across the annual data. The 2010 Fragility Matrix uses a slightly altered set of cutpoints for the “social legitimacy” indicator because of a change in the UNDP formulation of the “human development index” on which our indicator which it is based. We have added two countries to our matrix: Cape Verde (because its population has reached the

500,000 threshold for inclusion) and Kosovo (acknowledging that its sovereignty remains contested).

In summary, the global total of “state fragility points” assessed in 2010 (i.e., State Fragility Index, SFI) **decreased** by 367 points (20.7 percent) from the 1995 assessments. In the formulation in figure 11, **we present the decrease in state fragility as an increase in societal-system resiliency.** Breaking the aggregate State Fragility Index into its two principal components, we see that the improvements were accounted for to a much greater degree by gains in Effectiveness (235 points; 25.3 percent decrease) than gains in Legitimacy (132 points; 15.7 percent decrease). This imbalance characterizes three of the four fragility dimensions; only the social effectiveness and legitimacy categories show greater change in legitimacy (72 points; 31.0 percent decrease) than effectiveness (58 points; 24.2 percent decrease) over the study period.

It is important to keep three things in mind when considering our analysis of state fragility: 1) Our measures of fragility are designed to provide objective, empirical evidence of comparable levels of the “underdevelopment” of individual societal-systems in the global system, so, **larger values of fragility are associated with lower levels of systemic well-being.** This “more is less” perspective is counter-intuitive. 2) We use “state-level” measures to assess societal-system qualities due to the primacy of the state in setting public policy and because the state is the focal point for information/data on systemic well-being; we cannot assess internal distributions of well-being. 3) “Zero” fragility is set at a reasonable, and perhaps sustainable, level of well-being that is conducive to good governance; it is not presented as a maximum or optimal level of well-being.




Figure 11. Global Net Decrease in Fragility Scores, 1995-2010

Consistent with the relative paucity of major warfare in the global system in 2010 (although warfare increased sharply in the Arab League States in 2011, see figure 10a) and in light of the rapid decline in warfare globally since the early 1990s (as shown in figure 3, above), the Security Effectiveness category shows the lowest summed fragility score of the eight fragility categories: 76 total fragility points in 2010, and one of the greatest improvements among the eight categories of fragility (40 points; a 34.5 percent decrease from 1995). The other seven categories contribute far greater fragility point subtotals to the global total in 2010, ranging from 156 points in the Political Effectiveness category to 292 points in the Economic Effectiveness category. Security Legitimacy (state repression) shows very modest improvement since 1995 (172 total; having dropped only 15 points for a 8.1 percent decrease). Political Effectiveness, reflecting the three regional cascades of democratization and stabilization of more

open political systems in the Globalization Era, shows the most dramatic improvement (156 total, down 81 points and a 34.8 percent decrease in that category of fragility). The Political Legitimacy category shows fairly strong improvement over the period (down 48 points to a 179 total; a 21.5 percent decrease). The economic dimension shows only modest gains in Economic Effectiveness (292 total fragility points, down 56 points; a 16.5 percent decrease) and no real change in Economic Legitimacy at the global system level, reflecting the general failure of primary commodity producers (rentier states) to reinvest foreign exchange earnings into greater, local and regional manufacturing capacity.¹¹ On the hand, steady progress can be noted in general improvements in Social

¹¹ Note that our measure of Economic Effectiveness is a five-point scale (0-4) derived from quintile cutpoints in state incomes (GDP/capita) in the 2004 baseline year using constant 2000 \$US. This indicator contributes as many as four points to the fragility index; all the other indicators contribute up to three.

Effectiveness (184 total, down 58 points; 24.2 percent decrease) and Social Legitimacy (160 total, down 72 points for a 31.0 percent decrease since 1995).

Our use of standardized and comparable (objective) measures for each of the eight component indicators allows us to monitor and track changes in State Fragility annually since 1995 (the first year for which all eight measures are available). This is an important and unique innovation in monitoring global system performance, allowing us to show that improvements in state fragility (and greater societal-system resilience) coincide with improvements noted in global armed conflict and governance. Taken together, these congruent improvements in the global system provide both a general, progressive assessment of the performance of the global system and evidence of a “peace dividend” since the ending of the Cold War.

Individual and Regional Changes in State Fragility: As mentioned, in order to gain a better understanding of change in the general performance of the global system, we use the State Fragility Index and Matrix assessment methodology to calculate scores for each country in earlier years and, then, examine the changes in assessed values across time, as we have done in the prior section at the global level. To this purpose, we examine each country’s fragility scores and regional mean scores from 1995 to 2010.

Seventy-one (71) of the 161 countries listed in table 1 that have existed since 1995 show positive change in their State Fragility Index score of three points or more over the period (i.e., a lower fragility index score for the year 2010 as compared with their 1995 score); whereas, only nineteen (19) countries show negative change across the same period (i.e., a higher fragility index in 2010). In all, 115 of 160 countries show lower fragility scores in 2010 than in 1995 with 27

showing the same score and only 19 showing higher fragility scores (three countries, East Timor, Kosovo, and Montenegro did not exist in 1995; Serbia is considered the successor state to Serbia and Montenegro).

The countries showing the largest improvements in their fragility score across the study period are Guatemala (ten point decrease); Bosnia (nine point decrease); Bangladesh, Croatia, and Peru (eight point decrease); Angola, Azerbaijan, and Togo (seven point decrease); and Bhutan, Bulgaria, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Liberia, Lebanon, Mexico, Mali, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Romania, and El Salvador (improving by six points each). Countries with greater fragility scores across the period include Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, and Kyrgyzstan (four point increase); United States and Venezuela (three point increases); Belgium, Haiti, and Somalia (two point increases); and Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Israel, Malawi, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Norway, and Qatar (one point increases).

Figure 12, then, provides a regional summary of changes in State Fragility Index scores during the study period. States were assigned to one of six politically-salient regions: Non-Muslim Africa (sub-Saharan countries); Muslim Countries (i.e., countries in which Muslim confessional groups comprise fifty percent or more of the total population); (non-Muslim) South and East Asia; Latin America; (non-Muslim) Former-Socialist countries; and North Atlantic countries.¹²

Referring to figure 12, the bars in the graph show changes in the mean fragility score for

¹² Israel and Mauritius are isolated states and East Timor (2002), Montenegro (2006), and Kosovo (2008) are new states; these states are not included.

each region across the three periods (1995 and 2002, 2002 and 2010, and 1995 and 2010); the bars are measured on the left-hand axis. The red- and blue-diamond icons indicate each region's average State Fragility Index score at the beginning (1995) and end (2010) of the study period; the icons are measured on the right-hand axis. Note that, while Muslim countries are largely geographically concentrated in northern Africa and the Middle East, there are Muslim countries in Europe (Albania and Bosnia), the former-Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and southern Asia and Oceania (Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia). We treat the Muslim Countries as a separate category of states due to the current prominence of political Islam in global politics. The regions are arranged according to their mean State Fragility Index scores, with the most fragile region (Non-Muslim Africa; 14.24 mean score in 2010) on the left and the least fragile region (North Atlantic countries; 0.74 mean score in 2010) on the right.

The least fragile region in 2010 is the North Atlantic region; this region includes Western Europe, Canada, and the United States (nineteen countries in 2010).¹³ The North Atlantic region's mean State Fragility Index score in 2010 is 0.74, with scores ranging from 0 (eleven countries in 2010) to 3 (Cyprus and the United States). The largest changes in fragility score are that of the United States, for which there is a two-point fragility increase in Security Effectiveness (wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) and a one-point fragility increase in Security Legitimacy (increased use of state repression

¹³ Nineteen countries comprise the North Atlantic region: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

associated with the “global war on terrorism”) and Belgium, for which there is a two-point fragility increase in Political Legitimacy (due to the political salience of ethnicity and active factionalism between Flemish and Walloon identity groups).

Overall, the North Atlantic region has long been and still remains the standard for gauging regional performance and (lack of) fragility. The question remains whether this region has set a reasonable and achievable standard that is accessible to all countries in the global system or whether some moderation in regional consumption, income, and wealth is a necessary corollary to broader system access to reasonable and sustainable standards of achievement.

Closely following the North Atlantic region in terms of overall fragility is the Eastern European region comprising countries that have emerged from the Former-Socialist bloc, including many of the former-Soviet republics (except the predominantly Muslim countries of Albania, Bosnia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian republics).¹⁴ This region's mean score in 2010 is 3.32, with scores ranging from 0 (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia) to 10 (Moldova; Georgia follows with a score of 8 and Russia with 7).

This Former-Socialist region charts the greatest net improvement in fragility scores since 1995 with a decrease in the regional mean SFI score of 3.47 (cutting the regional mean by over half). The overall change in

¹⁴ Twenty countries comprise the Former-Socialist region: Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Montenegro became an independent state in 2006 and, so, is not included in the comparative regional analysis.




Figure 12. Changes in Mean Fragility Score by Region, 1995-2010

mean fragility scores for this region is due mainly to improvements in effectiveness (these countries scored well for legitimacy in 1995); these improvements are nearly equally spread across the political, economic, and social effectiveness dimensions (this region experienced relatively little fragility in the security dimension during the last decades of the Cold War). Smaller changes in fragility are notable in areas where this region had already made substantial achievements: security effectiveness and legitimacy and economic legitimacy. Improvements were spread fairly equally across the contemporary period with a slight increase in the latter half of the period. Of special note are Croatia, which reduced its State Fragility Index score by eight points and Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Romania which reduced their state fragility scores by six points each between 1995 and 2010.

Latin America countries improved their mean fragility scores by about the regional

average: 2.61 points. The mean fragility score for the region in 2010, however, stands at more than twice that of the Former-Socialist countries (7.13 in 2010).¹⁵ Scores for Latin American countries range from 0 (Costa Rica) to 18 (Haiti; Colombia and Ecuador follow with scores of 12 and Bolivia, Guyana, Nicaragua, and Venezuela score 11). Of the five state fragility regions compared in figure 12, the Latin America region shows the weakest improvement during the latter half of the study period (i.e., from 2002 to 2010).

Latin American improvement was driven largely by gains in effectiveness. In 2010, the legitimacy component of the mean fragility score for the region (4.56 points) was over seventy-five percent higher than the effectiveness component (2.57 points). The

¹⁵ The Latin America region comprises twenty-three countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

region performed particularly poorly in improving its Security, Political, and Economic Legitimacy; however, some gains are noted in reducing regional fragility in Social Legitimacy. Guatemala led the region in improvement over this period, reducing its fragility score by ten points (the most substantive improvement of any country in the global system), followed by Peru with an eight-point improvement and El Salvador, Mexico and Panama with six-point reductions in fragility. In contrast to the regional and global trends, the State Fragility Indices for Venezuela and Haiti increased by three and two points respectively across the study period.

As noted in our 2007 *Global Report*, the rate of growth of the regional income for the South and East Asia region, as a whole, nearly doubled the rate of economic growth in the world's richest countries; with much of the gains accounted for by the emergence of China as a major producer on the global market. Fragility scores for this region show moderate and consistent improvement across the emerging era of globalization, with an average decrease in overall fragility of just over two points (2.23); the regional mean score stands at 8.27 in 2010.¹⁶ This region shows one of the broadest ranges of fragility scores, from 0 (Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Taiwan) to 22 (Myanmar; Nepal scores next at 15 points, with East Timor, India, Laos, and Sri Lanka at 13 and Cambodia at 12).

Measured improvements in this region are more limited than any of the four other

¹⁶ The (non-Muslim) East and South Asia region consists of twenty-three countries: Australia, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, East Timor, Fiji, India, Japan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. East Timor became an independent state in 2002 and, so, is not included in the comparative analysis.

lesser developed regions; change is noted similarly in each of the two principal components: effectiveness (1.27 point decrease) and legitimacy (0.95 point decrease). Substantive improvements are noted for Security and Economic Effectiveness and Political and Social Legitimacy; no net change is noted for Economic Legitimacy. Improvement has been particularly strong in Bhutan and Papua New Guinea (six points each), followed by Cambodia and Laos (four points each). During the same period, the fragility rating for Nepal and Myanmar (Burma) increased by one point each.

Due to popular perceptions of rising tensions across the Islamic countries, we examine these countries separately as a distinct, and nearly contiguous, global region. The "Muslim Countries" region was identified in the 2007 *Global Report* as one of the world's two "poor-performance" regions in terms of economic development (along with Non-Muslim Africa).¹⁷ Between 1995 and 2010, the Muslim Countries recorded moderate improvement in the regional mean fragility score (2.62); gains in effectiveness outpaced gains in legitimacy by sixty percent (1.62 and 1.00 respectively). The range of fragility scores spans from a low of 3 (Kuwait and United Arab Emirates; Albania and Bahrain score 4 points) to the maximum value of 25 in

¹⁷ Muslim Countries are identified as countries in which Muslim confessional groups comprise fifty percent or more of the country's total population. This region is defined by forty-three countries spanning from West Africa to the Pacific Ocean, including Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

Somalia (Sudan comes in next with 24; close behind are Afghanistan and Chad with 22). Improvements in regional fragility are moderate across the Security, Political, Economic, and Social Effectiveness dimensions. The Muslim Countries region stands out because of its relatively large net fragility increase in Economic Legitimacy (i.e., it is becoming more dependent on revenues from primary commodities, mainly oil). The Muslim Countries region has made the largest gains of all regions in Social Legitimacy, improving by nearly one point on average across the study period. Despite its continued dependence on EU supervision and its trifurcation into ethnic blocs, Bosnia measures the largest improvement in the region with a nine point improvement in its fragility rating since 1995. Other states in the region with notable improvement include Bangladesh (eight points), Azerbaijan (seven points), and Lebanon, Mali, and Tunisia (six points each). Kyrgyzstan (-4), Somalia (-2), The Gambia (-1), and Qatar (-1) buck the global trend by measuring increases in state fragility over the period.

Countries comprising the Non-Muslim Africa region have the world's highest mean State Fragility Index score (14.24) and showed an average net improvement in fragility ratings across the period (2.41).¹⁸ After showing only limited net improvement in regional fragility in the first part of the globalization era (0.56), Non-Muslim Africa made far more substantive gains in the second half of the period (1.85).

¹⁸ Non-Muslim Africa comprises thirty-four countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Fragility scores for this region range from 3 (Botswana) to 23 (Democratic Republic of Congo). Some African countries are notable for having reduced their fragility ratings substantially across the study period: Angola and Togo have improved their fragility scores the most in this region (seven points each) while Equatorial Guinea and Liberia have reduced their fragility by six points each. The Africa region also has the most states that show increased fragility over this period: fragility in Central African Republic and Cote d'Ivoire worsened by four points each and four African countries suffered one point increases in their SFI score: Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Malawi.

Countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region show equal net improvement in Effectiveness and Legitimacy. The region shows only modest improvement in each of the fragility categories; much of the region's net gain has come in Political Effectiveness. Particularly disheartening is the lack of substantial improvement in the region's Social Effectiveness and Social Legitimacy scores. Although we would expect to see the most improvement in these areas due to NGO and international donor efforts in these areas since 1995, we in fact see almost no net change in the earlier half of the period and only modest gains in the more recent half of the period.

Concluding Remarks: The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of globalization that is, for the first time, governed predominantly by democratic regimes; this marks a watershed moment in modern human history and the beginning of a new, global, social order. However, this new world order encompasses a global system that, while improving steadily according to our analysis, lacks the capacity and resiliency that would provide a solid foundation for a stable and durable societal-system. The *Global Report 2007* charted a global

distribution of income among its constituent states characterized by highly unequal regional development and profiled a “system that is profoundly split into ‘Haves’ (about 15% of the global population) and ‘Have-nots.’ [A system in which] the potential for polarization and factionalism...is quite high and...will remain high for the foreseeable future.”¹⁹

Global Report 2009 underscored the continuing malaise affecting both Non-Muslim Africa and the Muslim regions and highlighted a general imbalance between substantial gains in effectiveness and continuing deficits in legitimacy. This imbalance is especially problematic when considered in the context of our growing investment in and reliance on democratic governance and aspirations for a “democratic peace.” While governance at the state level has become predominantly democratic, the nature and quality of governance at the global system level is challenged by the large number of anocratic states struggling to recover and/or maintain political stability; a similar number of states working to consolidate recent democratic gains; a relatively small number of very powerful and influential, yet highly vulnerable, old democratic states; and a small and shrinking number of classic autocracies that control some of the world’s most vital and coveted energy reserves.

Governance at the global level, whether formal or informal, is bound to reflect the nature and quality of the contrasts inherent in the system itself. While violent conflict in the global system continues to diminish in total magnitude, some protracted societal wars continue to counter the general trend and defy proactive engagement, new wars break out regularly, and extremist violence and radical tactics draw crucial resources and distract attention away from systemic

development. At the same time, non-fragile donor states place what may prove to be impossible standards on developing countries that undermine their ability to manage complex challenges and establish a stable foundation for further progress, making them more, rather than less, dependent on donor assistance and, thus, accelerating donor frustration and fatigue by disabling local achievement and pushing pivotal, regional states out of the systemic management network.

We believe that our observations have compiled an encouraging report on global system performance in the emerging era of globalization. However, we caution that this progress has largely been purchased with a “peace dividend” that may now be largely spent. Further progress and consolidation of the new global order will surely demand a determined partnership and unwavering commitment among states and citizens to reason and moderation in managing the challenges that define our common predicament.

THE STATE FRAGILITY INDEX AND MATRIX 2010

Having examined the general performance of the Global System of States in the areas of security, governance, and development and discussed changes in the fragility of states since 1995, we conclude this *Global Report 2011* with our assessments of the fragility of the system’s constituent units: the 164 independent (macro) states. The idea of using a matrix of effectiveness and legitimacy dimensions as a method for assessing state fragility was originally developed at the University of Maryland’s IRIS center, in response to a research request from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Contributions to developing the idea were made by a number of people at IRIS and

¹⁹ Marshall and Goldstone 2007, p. 11.

those involved in parallel efforts at USAID; however, the matrix of indicators reported here was specifically designed and applied by Marshall and Cole and reported annually in the *Global Report* series (since 2007).²⁰

The idea is similar to other multi-dimensional schemes for addressing state fragility, failure, or peace, including earlier indices developed by Marshall and Ted Gurr for the *Peace and Conflict* series, models designed by the US Government's Political Instability Task Force (in which Marshall, Jack Goldstone, and Gurr have played key roles), those developed by Frederick Barton and associates at CSIS, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy created by David Carment, metrics developed for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization under Carlos Pasquale in the State Department, the Fund for Peace's "Failed States Index," and the more recent "Global Peace Index" developed by the *Economist* Intelligence Unit for the Vision of Humanity organization and the "Index of State Weakness" developed at The Brookings Institution.²¹

All of these schemes recognize that any assessment of a state's ability to win the loyalty of its people depends on its performance in multiple spheres, spanning governance, economic performance and opportunity, security, and delivery of social services. What the IRIS research team added was to make explicit the need for governing regimes to exhibit *both* effectiveness *and* legitimacy in its performance

²⁰ Electronic copies of previous editions in the *Global Report* series are available in PDF format in the "Virtual Library" on the Center for Systemic Peace Web site.

²¹ See Monty G. Marshall, "Fragility, Instability, and the Failure of States: Assessing the Sources of Systemic Risk," Center for Preventive Action, Working Paper 1, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, for a detailed, comparative analysis of such composite indicators.

of those tasks. That is, to achieve maximum stability a regime must both carry out the tasks expected of a competent government, *and* maintain legitimacy by being perceived as just and fair in the manner it carries out those tasks. A state may remain in a condition of fragile instability if it lacks effectiveness *or* legitimacy in a number of dimensions; however a state is likely to fail, or to already be a failed state, if it has lost both.

The partnership between the Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems Research Inc makes the State Fragility assessments unique in that they are based on real-time monitoring of security and political conditions in each of the 164 countries under examination and they use well-respected and annually updated data sources for the quantitative assessments. These primary information resources make the State Fragility Index and Matrix as current and consistent as possible.

STATE FRAGILITY COLOR ICONS

Table 1, which begins on the following page, presents the State Fragility Index and Matrix 2010 and the corresponding ratings of the global system's 164 countries. It is accompanied by detailed Technical Notes that identify each of the data sources used and describe how the various indicators were constructed. Colors icons used in the table are employed intuitively:

■ **Black Icons** (used only for the Economic Effectiveness) represent "extreme fragility" and a score of 4;

■ **Red Icons** represent "high fragility" and a score of 3;

■ **Orange Icons** represent "moderate fragility" and a score of 2;

■ **Yellow Icons** represent "low fragility" and a score of 1; and

■ **Green Icons** represent "no fragility" and a score of 0.

Table 1: State Fragility Index and Matrix 2010

Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole
Center for Systemic Peace

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Somalia	25	13	12	■	■	War	■	■	—	■	■		■	■	Mus
Sudan	24	12	12	■	■	War	■	■	aut	■	■	3	■	■	Mus
Dem. Rep. of Congo	23	12	11	■	■	War	■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	Afr
Afghanistan	22	12	10	■	■	War	■	■	—	■	■		■	■	Mus
Chad	22	12	10	■	■	War	■	■	aut	■	■	4	■	■	Mus
Myanmar (Burma)	22	11	11	■	■	War	■	■	AUT	■	■		■	■	
Ethiopia	21	11	10	■	■	War	■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	Afr
Cote d'Ivoire	20	10	10	■	■	X	■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	Mus
Sierra Leone	19	11	8	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Burundi	18	12	6	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Central African Rep.	18	10	8	■	■	War	■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Afr
Guinea	18	9	9	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	Mus
Haiti	18	10	8	■	■	X	■	■	—	■	■		■	■	
Liberia	18	11	7	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Niger	18	10	8	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Mus
Burkina Faso	17	10	7	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Afr
Guinea-Bissau	17	10	7	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Iraq	17	9	8	■	■	War	■	■	dem	■	■	19	■	■	Mus
Nigeria	17	8	9	■	■	War	■	■	dem	■	■	5	■	■	Afr
Rwanda	17	10	7	■	■	*	■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Afr
Uganda	17	10	7	■	■	X	■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Afr
Zimbabwe	17	10	7	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	Afr
Angola	16	7	9	■	■	*	■	■	aut	■	■	37	■	■	Afr
Cameroon	16	7	9	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Afr

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Congo-Brazzaville	16	7	9	■	■	*	■	■	aut	■	■	28	■	■	Afr
Malawi	16	8	8	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Mauritania	16	8	8	■	■	*	■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Mus
Yemen	16	7	9	■	■	War	■	■	aut	■	■	2	■	■	Mus
Algeria	15	6	9	■	■	*	■	■	aut	■	■	18	■	■	Mus
Gambia	15	10	5	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Mus
Nepal	15	9	6	■	■	X	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	
Pakistan	15	8	7	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Mus
Zambia	15	8	7	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Ghana	14	8	6	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Kyrgyzstan	14	10	4	■	■	X	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Madagascar	14	9	5	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Afr
Mali	14	8	6	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Mus
Mozambique	14	7	7	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	Afr
Comoros	13	8	5	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Mus
Djibouti	13	6	7	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Egypt	13	5	8	■	■	X	■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Mus
India	13	8	5	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	
Laos	13	6	7	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■		■	■	
Sri Lanka	13	7	6	■	■	X	■	■	dem	■	■	+	■	■	
Timor Leste	13	8	5	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	28	■	■	
Togo	13	7	6	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■	+	■	■	Afr
Uzbekistan	13	5	8	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Azerbaijan	12	5	7	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■	38	■	■	Mus
Bangladesh	12	7	5	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	Mus
Benin	12	6	6	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Cambodia	12	8	4	■	■	*	■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	
Colombia	12	4	8	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■	4	■	■	

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Ecuador	12	4	8	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■	8	■	■	
Eritrea	12	8	4	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■		■	■	Afr
Iran	12	4	8	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■	12	■	■	Mus
Kenya	12	7	5	■	■	X	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Tajikistan	12	7	5	■	■	*	■	■	aut	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Tanzania	12	6	6	■	■		■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	Afr
Bhutan	11	5	6	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	
Bolivia	11	4	7	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	
Equatorial Guinea	11	3	8	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■	169	■	■	Afr
Gabon	11	3	8	■	■		■	■	dem	■	■	51	■	■	Afr
Guyana	11	3	8	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Lesotho	11	8	3	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Nicaragua	11	5	6	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Philippines	11	8	3	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Venezuela	11	3	8	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■	21	■	■	
Guatemala	10	5	5	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Indonesia	10	6	4	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Mus
Kazakhstan	10	4	6	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	30	■	■	Mus
Korea, North	10	5	5	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■		■	■	
Moldova	10	5	5	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Papua New Guinea	10	5	5	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	
Saudi Arabia	10	2	8	■	■	X	■	■	AUT	■	■	111	■	■	Mus
Syria	10	4	6	■	■	War	■	■	AUT	■	■	2	■	■	Mus
Turkey	10	4	6	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Turkmenistan	10	4	6	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	6	■	■	Mus
China	9	4	5	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■	+	■	■	
Honduras	9	4	5	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Senegal	9	5	4	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Mus

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Solomon Islands	9	6	3	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Georgia	8	5	3	■	■	X	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	
Israel	8	2	6	■	■	X	■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Mongolia	8	4	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Paraguay	8	4	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
South Africa	8	4	4	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Afr
Swaziland	8	5	3	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	+	■	■	Afr
Tunisia	8	4	4	■	■		■	■	—	■	■		■	■	Mus
Vietnam	8	5	3	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■		■	■	
Cuba	7	2	5	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	+	■	■	
Fiji	7	5	2	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■	+	■	■	
Kosovo	7	4	3	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	na	■	■	Mus
Libya	7	1	6	■	■	War	■	■	—	■	■	84	■	■	Mus
Peru	7	2	5	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	
Russia	7	3	4	■	■	War	■	■	dem	■	■	19	■	■	
Thailand	7	4	3	■	■	War	■	■	dem	■	■	+	■	■	
Armenia	6	4	2	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■	+	■	■	
Brazil	6	2	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	
Cape Verde	6	4	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Afr
Dominican Republic	6	2	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Jordan	6	3	3	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Lebanon	6	2	4	■	■	X	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Morocco	6	4	2	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Namibia	6	2	4	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Afr
Qatar	6	2	4	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	308	■	■	Mus
Serbia	6	4	2	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Ukraine	6	3	3	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Bosnia	5	3	2	■	■	*	■	■	—	■	■	+	■	■	Mus

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
El Salvador	5	2	3	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Macedonia	5	3	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Malaysia	5	1	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	1	■	■	Mus
Oman	5	2	3	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	91	■	■	Mus
Albania	4	3	1	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Bahrain	4	0	4	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■		■	■	Mus
Belarus	4	3	1	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	+	■	■	
Jamaica	4	2	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Mexico	4	1	3	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■	3	■	■	
Panama	4	0	4	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Romania	4	1	3	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Trinidad	4	0	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	28	■	■	
Botswana	3	2	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Afr
Cyprus	3	0	3	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Kuwait	3	0	3	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■	267	■	■	Mus
Montenegro	3	3	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
United Arab Emirates	3	0	3	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	176	■	■	Mus
United States	3	2	1	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Australia	2	0	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Belgium	2	0	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Bulgaria	2	1	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Chile	2	0	2	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Croatia	2	0	2	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Norway	2	0	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	144	■	■	
Singapore	2	0	2	■	■		■	■	dem	■	■	X	■	■	
Argentina	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	1	■	■	
Czech Republic	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
France	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Greece	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Lithuania	1	1	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Mauritius	1	1	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Slovakia	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Spain	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Switzerland	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Uruguay	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Austria	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Canada	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	13	■	■	
Costa Rica	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Denmark	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	5	■	■	
Estonia	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Finland	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Germany	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Hungary	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Ireland	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Italy	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Japan	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Korea, South	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Latvia	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Netherlands	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
New Zealand	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Poland	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Portugal	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Slovenia	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Sweden	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Taiwan	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
United Kingdom	0	0	0	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	

TECHNICAL NOTES TO THE STATE FRAGILITY INDEX AND MATRIX 2010:

The State Fragility Index and Matrix 2010 lists all independent countries in the world in which the total country population is greater than 500,000 in 2010 (164 countries). The Fragility Matrix scores each country on both Effectiveness and Legitimacy in four performance dimensions: Security, Political, Economic, and Social, at the end of the year 2010. Each of the Matrix indicators is rated on a four-point fragility scale: 0 "no fragility," 1 "low fragility," 2 "medium fragility," and 3 "high fragility" with the exception of the Economic Effectiveness indicator, which is rated on a five-point fragility scale (including 4 "extreme fragility"). The State Fragility Index, then, combines scores on the eight indicators and ranges from 0 "no fragility" to 25 "extreme fragility." A country's fragility is closely associated with its *state capacity* to manage conflict; make and implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its *systemic resilience* in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises, and sustaining progressive development.

Fragility Indices

State Fragility Index = Effectiveness Score + Legitimacy Score (25 points possible)

Effectiveness Score = Security Effectiveness + Political Effectiveness + Economic Effectiveness + Social Effectiveness (13 points possible)

Legitimacy Score = Security Legitimacy + Political Legitimacy + Economic Legitimacy + Social Legitimacy (12 points possible)

General Notes: The State Fragility Index and Matrix was originally introduced in "Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007." In order to standardize procedures for scoring each of the eight component indicators in order to make the indicators and indices comparable across time, we set threshold values for the categorical fragility scores based on cut-points derived from values in a baseline year (2004). This methodology effects continuous measures used for Economic Effectiveness (GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars); Economic Legitimacy (manufacturing exports as a percent of merchandise exports); Social Effectiveness (human development indicator; HDI); and Social Legitimacy (infant mortality rate); baseline specifications are provided in the relevant indicator explanations that follow. Social Effectiveness scores were revised slightly due to a change in the formulation of the Human Development Index by the UNDP *Human Development Report* in 2010. The Economic Effectiveness indicator was rescaled in 2009 and a fifth value was added to denote "extreme fragility" in countries that have a GDP per capita of \$400 or less (constant 2000 US\$). In addition, a fourth indicator was added in 2008 to the calculation of the Political Legitimacy Score (scores for all previous years have been recalculated; state fragility scores have been calculated for all countries annually beginning with 1995). As several of the Matrix indicators use "most recent year available" data, the Matrix scores are carried forward and adjusted when new data becomes available; see details below. Trends graphs (figures 2-4 below) include only the 161 countries that have existed since 1995 (Kosovo, Montenegro, and Timor Leste are not included in the trends/comparisons; South Sudan gained independence in 2011).

Security Indicators

Security Effectiveness ("seceff") Score: Total Residual War, a measure of general security and vulnerability to political violence, 1986-2010 (25 years). Source: Monty G. Marshall, Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2010, (www.systemicpeace.org), variable name "actotal." The formula to calculate this score is based on two assumptions: (1) the residual effects of low level and/or short wars diminish relatively quickly; and (2) the residual effects of serious or protracted wars diminish gradually over a 25-year period. Three indicators are used to calculate each country's "residual war" score (*reswartot*): *warsum1-4* (sum of annual scores for all wars in which the country is directly involved for each continuous period of armed conflict); *yrnowar1-3* (interim years of "no war" between periods of armed conflict); and *yrpeace* (years of peace, or no war, since the end of most recent war period). For states with one war episode: $reswartot = warsum - [yrpeace + (0.04yrpeace \times warsum)]$. For countries with multiple periods of war, a *reswar* value is calculated for each, in chronological order. Thus, for a state with two episodes of war, to calculate the first episode: $reswar1 = warsum1 - [yrnowar1 + (0.04yrnowar1 \times warsum1)]$; and for the second episode: $reswartot = (reswar1 + warsum2) - \{yrpeace + [0.04yrpeace \times (reswar1 + warsum1)]\}$; and so on. Any negative residual war (*reswar*) scores are converted to zero before calculating additional residual war scores. The final *reswartot* value is then converted to a four-point fragility scale, where: 0 = 0; 1 = 0.1-15; 2 = 15.1-100; and 3 = greater than 100.

Security Legitimacy ("secleg") Score: State Repression, a measure of state repression, 1995-2009. Source: Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale (PTS; www.politicalterror.org). The PTS provides separate annual indicators drawn from U.S. State Department and Amnesty International reports; each indicator is coded on a five-point scale, from 1: "no repression" to 5: "systemic, collective repression." To determine the state repression score, we calculate the following: (1) nine-year average, 1996-2004; (2) four-year average, 2005-2008; and (3) most recent value, 2009; the three, mean indicators are then compared according to a fragility categorization: 0 = 1.0-2.0; 1 = 2.1-3.0; 2 = 3.1-4.0; and 3 = greater

than 4.0. If the most recent year value agrees with the previous four-year average, then these two means are used to identify the repression category. When the most recent year score is not in agreement with the previous period, then the earlier nine-year mean is used to help determine a more general pattern in state repression. Historical treatments, that is, calculations of Security Legitimacy Scores for previous years, are further aided by reference to patterns in "future" PTS values. The exact year of change in the general practice of state repression and, so, the Security Legitimacy Score can be more confidently identified in the historical treatment. Because the calculated value on this indicator is based on year 2009 data, the indicator value is assigned to the 2009 Matrix "secleg" score and that score is carried forward to the 2010 Matrix.

Referent Indicator: The *Armed Conflict Indicator* provides a general indicator of the country's most recent experience with major armed conflict, including wars of independence, communal wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and inter-state wars. Referent indicators are not used in the calculation of state fragility scores. Source: Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2010, Center for Systemic Peace. A dark shaded "War" entry indicates a country is actively involved in a major armed conflict(s) in mid-2011; a medium shaded "X" indicates that the country has emerged from major armed conflict(s) in the past five years (since mid-2006); and a light shaded "*" indicates that the country has been directly involved in one or more major armed conflicts sometime during the previous twenty year period (1986-2005) but has not experienced a major armed conflict since, that is, for at least the past five years.

Political Indicators

Political Effectiveness ("poleff") Score: Regime/Governance Stability, 1995-2010. Sources: Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers, and Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010; Henry S. Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, Leadership Duration (updated by Monty G. Marshall); and Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall, Coups d'Etat, 1946-2010, datasets (www.systemicpeace.org). Three indicators are used to calculate the Regime/Governance Stability score: Regime Durability (Polity IV, 2010); Current Leader's Year's in Office (Leadership Duration, 2010); and Total Number of Coup Events 1995-2010, including successful, attempted, plotted, alleged coups and forced resignations or assassinations of chief executives, but not including coup events associated with Polity adverse regime changes (these major regime changes cause the "durability" score to be reset to "0" and, so, would be double-counted, see above). These indicators are scored such that: Durability < 10 years = 1; Leader Years in Office > 12 years = 1; and Total Coup Events: 1-2 = 1 and >2 = 2. These indicators are then added to produce the Regime/Governance Stability score (scores of 4 are recoded as 3). Note: Countries coded in the Polity IV dataset as an "interregnum" (i.e., total or near total collapse of central authority, -77) for the current year are scored 3 on the Political Effectiveness indicator.

Political Legitimacy ("polleg") Score: Regime/Governance Inclusion, 2010. Sources: Polity IV, 2010; Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall, and Victor Asal, Minorities at Risk Discrimination 2010 (updated by Monty G. Marshall); and Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Elite Leadership Characteristics 2010 (updated by Monty G. Marshall). In the 2007 report, four indicators were used to determine the Regime/Governance Inclusion score: Factionalism (Polity IV, *parcomp* value 3 = 1); Ethnic Group Political Discrimination against 5% or more of the population (Discrimination: *POLDIS* values 2, 3, 4 = 1); Political Salience of Elite Ethnicity (Elite Leadership Characteristics: *ELETH* values 1 or 2 = 1); and Polity Fragmentation (Polity IV, *fragment* value greater than 0 = 1). To these indicators, we have added Exclusionary Ideology of Ruling Elite (Elite Leadership Characteristics: *ELITI* value 1 = 1). Political Legitimacy Score is calculated by adding these five indicators; scores of 4 or 5 (rare) are recoded as 3.

Referent Indicator: The *Regime Type* column provides a general indicator of the country's regime type in mid-2011 based on the "polity" score recorded in the Polity IV data series. An upper case "AUT" indicates the country is governed by an institutionalized autocratic regime (POLITY -6 to -10); a lower case "aut" indicates that the country is governed by an uninstitutionalized, or "weak," autocratic regime (other EXREC 1 to 5). An upper case "DEM" indicates an institutionalized democracy (POLITY 6 to 10) and a lower case "dem" indicates an uninstitutionalized, or "weak," democratic regime (other EXREC 6 to 8). Countries denoted with a dash "-" indicates that the country is has only limited central governance, either because of a regime failure (Libya and Somalia), foreign occupation (Afghanistan and Bosnia), or a transitional government (Ivory Coast). As the Polity IV indicator of "polar factionalism" has proven to be a very potent indicator of political instability, regimes that are denoted as factional (i.e., PARCOMP=3) are shaded; in addition, transitional (POLITY score -88), failed (POLITY score -77), and occupied (POLITY score -66) are also considered unstable and, so, are shaded on this indicator.

Economic Indicators

Economic Effectiveness ("ecoeff") Score: Gross Domestic Product per Capita (constant 2000 US\$), 2003-2009. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2010 (www.worldbank.org/data). The annual values for the past seven years are reviewed to verify that the value in the most recent year is consistent with values in previous years and that a threshold/category change in a country's GDP per capita indicator score is part of a

consistent trend and not simply a short-term aberration from that trend. The value for the most recent year (2009) is coded into a five-point fragility scale, based on cut-points derived from the threshold values for the fit of the State Fragility Index and GDP per capita in a baseline year (2004). The standardized categories are as follows: 4 = less than or equal to \$400.00; 3 = \$400.01 to \$1000; 2 = \$1000.01 to \$2500.00; 1 = \$2500.01 to \$5000; and 0 = greater than \$5000. When a country's 2009 value exceeds the borderline value separating categories, the fifteen-year income growth indicator is used to assign the final score: selecting the higher fragility category if long-term growth is negative or the lower fragility category if long-term growth is positive. Because the calculated value on this indicator is based on year 2009 data, the indicator value is assigned to the 2009 Matrix "ecoeff" score and that score is carried forward to the 2010 Matrix.

Economic Legitimacy ("ecoleg") Score: Share of Export Trade in Manufactured Goods, 1995-2008. Source: UN Development Programme, Structure of Trade, 2010, and World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), 2010, (manufacturing as a percentage of merchandise exports). Merchandise exports include two classes of products: manufactured goods and primary commodities; low percentage of manufactured goods indicates a high reliance on primary commodities for foreign exchange. The annual values of this variable are examined to ensure that the most recent annual value is a representative value within the established range for that country. The manufacturing percentage of merchandise exports is then converted to a four-point fragility score, where: 3 = less than or equal to 10; 2 = greater than 10 and less than or equal to 25; 1 = greater than 25 and less than or equal to 40; and 0 = greater than 40. Because the calculated value on this indicator is based on year 2008 data, the indicator value is assigned to the 2008 Matrix "ecoleg" score and that score is carried forward to both the 2009 and 2010 Matrix. The world's main illicit drug producing/supplying countries: Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar), and Columbia are given the highest value (3) on this indicator.

Referent Indicator: The *Net Oil Production or Consumption* indicator provides information on a country's 2010 petroleum energy profile expressed in net "barrels per capita" as reported by the US Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov). The indicator value is calculated by subtracting the country's reported total daily consumption figure from its total daily production figure (in thousands of barrels), multiplying the result by 365 (to get an annual figure), and dividing by the country's total population (in thousands). A dark-shaded numerical value (e.g., Qatar's **474**) indicates a net petroleum producer expressed in barrels per capita. A plus sign "+" indicates a moderate net petroleum consuming country (1-10 barrels per capita) and an "X" indicates a major net consuming country (greater than 10 barrels per capita). Blank cells indicate country's with low petroleum profiles (less than one barrel per capita producer or consumer).

Social Indicators

Social Effectiveness ("soceff") Score: Human Capital Development, 2010. Source: UNDP *Human Development Report 2010*, Human Development Index (HDI), 2010 (www.undp.org). Reported HDI values are converted according to a four-point fragility scale based on the cut-points of the lower three HDI quintiles in the baseline year, 2004. The Social Effectiveness Score is assigned as follows: 3 = less than or equal to .400; 2 = greater than .400 and less than or equal to .600; 1 = greater than .600 and less than or equal to .700; and 0 = greater than .700. **Note:** These cutpoints differ from those reported in previous editions of *Global Report*. This is due to a change in the formulation of the Human Development Index reported in the UNDP *Human Development Report* beginning in 2010. The new UNDP report provides scores for earlier years and orders countries similarly across the two (old and new) formulations of the HDI; thus the two indices could be combined to provide consistent coverage annually for the entire period, 1995-2010.

Social Legitimacy ("socleg") Score: Human Capital Care, 2010. Source: US Census Bureau, International Data Base, 2011, (IDB; www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb), Infant Mortality Rate, 2010. This indicator is based on the infant mortality rate (number of deaths of infants under one year of age from a cohort of 1,000 live births), with values converted to a four-point fragility scale based on the upper cut-points of the lower three quintiles of the infant mortality rates in the baseline year, 2004. The Social Legitimacy Score is assigned as follows: 3 = greater than 75.00; 2 = less than or equal to 75.00 and greater than 45.00; 1 = less than or equal to 45.00 and greater than 20.00; and 0 = less than or equal to 20.00. These scores are then adjusted according to ranking comparisons between the country's income level (GDP per capita) and human capital development (HDI). If the country's HDI ranking among the 164 countries listed is more than twenty-five places above its GDP per capita ranking (meaning it provides better human capital care than expected by its level of income) the Social Legitimacy Score (fragility) is lowered by one point. If HDI ranking is more than twenty-five places below GDP per capita ranking, the fragility score is increased by one point.

Referent Indicator: The *Regional Effects* indicator provides information to identify two important "neighborhood" clusters of countries: dark-shaded "**Mus**" indicates a country that is characterized by a Muslim majority (countries mainly located in northern Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southeast Asia) and unshaded "**Afr**" indicates a country located in non-Muslim (sub-Saharan) Africa.

CONTRIBUTORS

MONTY G. MARSHALL is the President of Societal-Systems Research Inc, a private consulting firm, and Director of the Center for Systemic Peace, a non-profit organization. Until July 2010, he was a Research Professor in the George Mason University School of Public Policy and Director of Research at the Center for Global Policy; he retains his association with GMU as a Senior Fellow. Dr. Marshall is engaged in complex societal-systems analysis, emphasizing societal networks and processes; focusing on the problems that limit and distort those networks and processes, such as political violence and authoritarianism; and examining the critical nexus among societal and systemic conflict, governance, and development structures and dynamics. Dr Marshall serves as a senior consultant with the United States Government's Political Instability Task Force (since 1998; formerly known as the State Failure Task Force) and consults frequently with various government agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. Dr. Marshall's systemic theory and evidence on contemporary societal development and conflict processes are detailed in *Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics* (Rowman & Littlefield 1999). In addition to the *Global Report* series, recent publications include a chapter on "Systemic Peacemaking in the Era of Globalization" in *Peacemaking: From Practice to Theory* (ABC-Clio, 2011); invited essays on governance in the *Harvard International Review* (Spring 2011) and *Social Science and Modern SOCIETY* (Jan-Feb 2011); a Political Instability Task Force collaborative work, "A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability" (*American Journal of Political Science*, January 2010) and a 2008 Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action Working Paper, "Fragility, Instability, and the Failure of States: Assessing the Sources of Systemic Risk." Dr. Marshall holds degrees from the Universities of Colorado, Maryland, and Iowa.

mgmarshall@systemicpeace.org

BENJAMIN R. COLE is a Research Associate at the Center for Systemic Peace and is currently serving as Post-Doctoral Fellow and Visiting Professor of Public Policy at the Nelson A. Rockefeller Center, Dartmouth College; previously, he held the position of Hood House Lecturer in International Affairs at the University of New Hampshire. Dr. Cole has accepted an appointment to the faculty of Simmons College in Boston beginning in September 2012. He holds degrees from the University of New Hampshire and the School of Public Policy, George Mason University. Dr. Cole's primary research interests include complexity theory, democratic transition, political instability, and civil society dynamics; in addition to the *Global Report* series, he has also published work in comparative healthcare and space policy. His doctoral dissertation proposes a new measure of governance based on contributions from complexity theory and conducts a macro-comparative investigation into the effects of regime type on policy outcomes.

benjamin.r.cole@dartmouth.edu

Global Report 2011

Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole



Center for Systemic Peace

www.systemicpeace.org